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Fault in Contract Law
Eric A. Posner1
March 13, 2008

Abstract. A promisor is strictly liable for breaching a contract, according to
the standard account. However, some cases and doctrines appear to recognize
that a promisor will not be liable, or will face reduced damages, if the breach
was the result of inadvertence rather than fault or willfulness. A negligencebased system of contract law can be given an economic interpretation, and it
is shown that such a system is in some respects more attractive than the strictliability system.

Anglo-American contract law is said to be a strict liability system, but it could
just as well be a fault-based system. Indeed, one can make a plausible case that a faultbased contract law would be superior to the strict liability system. A fault-based system
would result in courts enforcing optimal contracts more systematically than they do
currently—if courts could implement the system with sufficient accuracy. The
disadvantage of such a system is that courts would need to make difficult inquiries and
could make more errors. How the advantages and disadvantages balance out is hard to
determine.
As many authors have noticed, although Anglo-American contract law is usually
called a strict liability system, it does contain pockets of fault. Fault-like notions, such as
good faith and best efforts, recur in the cases; and terms are often implied in order to
ensure that obligations are reasonable rather than absolute. These doctrines reflect some
of the advantages of the fault-based system, and strengthen the theoretical basis for the
claim that fault ought to play a role in contract law.2
This paper has three parts. In Part I, it lays out the case for a fault-based contract
law. In Part II, it shows ways in which this idea is reflected in doctrine—not in all
1
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Cohen’s article is the most comprehensive discussion; however, he focuses on damages rules, which I will
for the most part ignore. See George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contracts Damages, 80 Va. L. Rev.
1225, 1238-39 (1994).

doctrine, but in some cases and rules. In both parts, I will limit my discussion to fault in
the perform or breach decision: the question is whether the promisor’s breach may be
excused because the breach was not his fault, or was not negligent. I will for the most
part ignore negligent representation and other doctrines related to the decision to enter a
contract in the first place.3 I also use a very simple model; a more complex model could
well lead to different results.
I conclude that the case for strict liability for breach of contract is not particularly
strong, and so we should not be surprised that so many pockets of fault-based liability
exist in contract law. The main puzzle that emerges from the discussion is why contract
law puts the burden on the wrongdoer to show that he was not at fault in order to avoid
paying damages, while tort law puts the burden on the victim to show that the wrongdoer
was at fault in order to obtain damages. In Part III, I discuss this puzzle.

I. Theory
A. A Model
Consider a contract where Buyer values a good at V, Seller’s cost in producing
the good is cH, with probability q (“bad state of the world”), and cL, with probability (1-q)
(“good state of the world”), where cH>V>cL. Buyer pays in advance a price, p, such that p
just covers Seller’s expected costs. Prior to performance, Seller can incur some cost x; if
Seller incurs this cost, q drops to 0; in other words, Seller can ensure that performance
will be at the low cost. The contract is made at time 0; Buyer pays at time 1; Seller
invests x or not at time 2; Seller’s cost of performance (c) is determined at time 3; and
Seller performs or breaches at time 4. Damages (d), if any, are paid at time 5.
Renegotiation is assumed to be impossible.
The conventional analysis of this setup in the literature is as follows.4
Performance is desirable if and only if the cost is low (the good state of the world),
3
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because V>cL and V<cH. The investment x is desirable if and only if x is less than the
cost savings from reducing the probability of cH from q to 0. Those cost savings equal the
benefit of the transaction being consummated (generating V-cL) where otherwise it would
not go through (with probability q). Thus, efficient investment requires that x<q(V-cL).
Optimal incentives can be easily provided in this setup. To ensure efficient
performance or breach, let Seller pay damages if she does not perform, and set those
damages equal to V (d=V). This remedy also ensures efficient investment. Because Seller
pays Buyer’s lost valuation if Seller does not perform, Seller fully internalizes the cost of
breach. Here, Seller will invest x as long as x<q(V-cL), as this reduces expected costs
from qV + (1-q)cL to cL. And if Seller does not invest x because x is high, Seller will
perform in the good state of the world and not perform (instead paying damages) in the
bad state of the world.
B. Fault
As has frequently been noted, this analysis does not depend on any notion of fault.
Seller is strictly liable for breach of contract.
However, we can imagine a fault-based approach that yields the same behavior.
Suppose that Seller is liable for breach of contract only if her breach was the result of
fault or willful action. Let us use the following definitions:
Seller’s breach is willful if the cost of performance is less than Buyer’s valuation
(c=cL), that is, the cost of performance is cL<V. In other words, inefficient breach is
willful; efficient breach is not willful.
Seller’s breach is negligent if the cost of performance is higher than Buyer’s
valuation (that is, c=cH), and Seller could have taken a cost-justified action to prevent this
from happening (that is, x<q(V-cL)) but did not. In other words, breach (whether or not
efficient) after failure to engage in efficient investment is negligent.
Seller’s breach is inadvertent (not her fault, and not giving rise to liability), if the
cost of performance is higher than Buyer’s valuation (that is, c=cH), and Seller could not
have taken a cost-justified action to prevent this from happening (that is, x>q(V-cL)).
Efficient breach after efficient investment is not negligent.

promisor with proper incentives to take precautions. With a few exceptions to be noted, they do not discuss
whether a fault-based liability rule should be used.
3

Seller pays damages only if the breach was willful or negligent. In either case, let
damages equal V.
It can be shown that this fault system produces efficient performance at time 4
and efficient investment at time 2. Efficiency requires that performance occur if and only
if V>c, that is, c= cL. Suppose that Seller engaged in efficient investment at time 2. Then
her cost is cL, and at time 4 she will perform if d>cL. Because d=V, d>cL, and so Seller
will perform.
Now consider whether Seller will engage in efficient investment at time 2. If
Seller does, she incurs cost x; and she will perform (see above), resulting in cost, cL.
Thus, the cost of investment is x + cL. If Seller does not engage in efficient investment,
she does not incur cost x. In the good state of the world (c=cL), she will perform (at cost
cL), because cL<d. In the bad state of the world (c=cH), she will breach and pay d=V.
Thus, the cost of not investing is qV + (1-q)cL. She will invest if x + cL < qV + (1-q)cL, or
x<q(V-cL), which is the condition for efficient investment.
C. A Comparison: Strict Liability Versus Negligence
If the strict liability system and the fault system lead to the same outcome—
efficient breach and efficient performance—do they have any important differences?
First, the fault system requires the court to make the negligence determination,
which might be difficult. The strict liability system does not. In particular, the negligence
approach, but not the strict liability approach, requires the court to determine whether
V>c and x<q(V-cL)—so it must determine V, c, x, and q. The strict liability system
requires that the court make an accurate damages determination—so it must determine V
and c only. Thus, along the dimension of administrative and error cost, strict liability is
superior to negligence.5
Second, the negligence system reduces the expected costs of transacting relative
to the strict liability system. In the negligence system, the potential breacher knows that
he does not have to pay damages in the bad state of the world if he could not have
prevented it from happening at reasonable cost. In the strict liability system, he does.
To see this difference more clearly, return to our example. Recall that Seller
charges a price that just covers her cost. Suppose also that x is arbitrarily close to zero, so
5
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that Seller will always incur x in order to eliminate the risk of c=cH. Under the strict
liability system p=x+cL. In the negligence system, we have the same result: p=x+cL.
Now imagine that x is arbitrarily high. In the strict liability system, p=qV+(1q)cL. The price must cover damages in the bad state (where d=V) and the cost of
performance in the good state. In the negligence system, p=(1-q)cL. In the negligence
system Seller does not have to pay d=V in the bad state of the world, as long as the bad
state could not have been avoided in cost-justified fashion. So for a range of x’s, the price
difference is somewhere between 0 and qV.
Thus, for any contract where x is not arbitrarily close to zero, the price will be
higher under the strict liability system than under the negligence system. In return for the
higher price, Buyer gets de facto insurance against the bad state of the world—a damages
payment equal to V.
From an ex ante perspective, the parties would almost certainly prefer the
negligence regime along this third dimension, holding constant administrative costs.
Buyer has no reason to purchase from Seller insurance against the bad state of the world.
In effect, the strict liability system forces Seller to sell an insurance policy to Buyer,
unless the parties incur drafting costs or renegotiation costs to avoid this outcome.6
A comparison to tort law is instructive. In a simple setup, where only one party
can cause the accident and take care, strict liability provides optimal incentives both for
that party to take care and for that party to choose the level of activity. In particular, the
party chooses the efficient activity level precisely because it pays damages if it causes an
accident even if it is not at fault. Strict liability forces the party to internalize all the thirdparty costs of his behavior.
But this activity-level logic does not carry through to contract law.7 The promisor
does not impose an externality on the promisee by entering a contract with him. Thus, the
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only effect of strict liability in contract law is to force the promisor to pay money to the
promisee in the bad state of the world, and demand a higher price ex ante (or a lower
price if the relevant promisor is the buyer)—or incur extra transaction costs in order to
bargain around the rule. As noted, the promisee will not usually gain from insurance, and
so strict liability makes the parties worse off than a negligence regime would—either
because it creates an unnecessary insurance contract or it raises transaction costs.
D. A Note on Victim’s Precautions
The analysis can be extended to the case where the victim can take precautions to
minimize the probability of breach or the harm that occurs as a result of the breach. In the
literature, this behavior is typically called “reliance.” In a strict liability system, if the
victim is fully compensated, he has an incentive to “overrely” because the promisor bears
the full cost. In the negligence approach that I have described, similarly the victim has an
incentive to overrely because his probability of recovery depends entirely on the
promisor’s actions, not his own.
The problem of victim precaution can be solved in various ways. In the literature,
scholars have generally suggested that the victim’s damages should be limited to what his
loss would be if he took efficient precautions (requiring a highly fact-intensive judicial
inquiry).8 In deciding how much to rely, the victim will realize that he will not be
compensated for the extent of overreliance, and thus will not have an incentive to engage
in overreliance. In the context of a negligence system, the victim’s incentives could also
be controlled with a contributory negligence rule. If the victim fails to take a costjustified precaution to minimize the extent of breach (that is, the victim overrelies), he is
denied recovery, even if the breacher was negligent. The tort analogy is negligence with a
defense of contributory negligence.
E. Summary
I should clarify what I have done and what I have not done. Scholars writing in
the contracts literature typically begin with a strict liability model where the promisor is
held to be liable if breach occurs, and focus on what the optimal level of damages is.
Under certain conditions, the optimal level of damages is zero. I have, in essence,
reinterpreted these models as negligence models: when those conditions for zero damages
8
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are satisfied, the promisor should be held to be not liable because not negligent (or
willful). The point of this reinterpretation is to show that the standard models used to
justify existing law implicitly justify a negligence standard. The natural question then
arises, whether the implicit role of the negligence standard in the models corresponds to
the way that courts decide cases.
At this point, I should be clear that I am not claiming that negligence plays the
same role in contract law as it does in tort law. In tort law, the plaintiff must, in most
cases, prove that the defendant acted negligently, and a court will evaluate the
defendant’s behavior against some substantive standard of fault in the course of
determining liability. Clearly, courts do not routinely and clearly engage in a similar
process in breach of contract cases. What I will argue, however, is that, under doctrinal
cover, courts do sometimes apply an implicit fault standard—in the sense of releasing
defendants from liability if the alleged breach was “inadvertent” rather than the result of
negligent or willful behavior.

II. Doctrine
Contract law is conventionally understood to be unconcerned with fault. In the
influential words of the Restatement:
Contract liability is strict liability. It is an accepted maxim that pacta sunt
servanda, contracts are to be kept. The obligor is therefore liable in damages for
breach of contract even if he is without fault and even if circumstances have made
the contract more burdensome or less desirable than he had anticipated.9
If the analysis in Part I is correct, however, it would be surprising if negligence
ideas played no role in contract law. In fact, as many scholars have noticed, they do.10
Here, I will briefly describe some of this doctrine, and then explain how it fits or does not
fit the theoretical analysis.
Throughout, the focus will be on doctrines that excuse the promisor from liability,
or dramatically reduce damages when the promisor could not avoid breach by taking
cost-justified precautions. I do not try to prove that all or most or even many cases
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actually reflect negligence-style thinking. I argue instead that, in some cases, negligencestyle thinking provides a natural interpretation of what the court did.
Impossibility/impracticability. The impossibility and impracticability doctrines
(henceforth, I will mention only the latter) provide that a promisor is excused from
performance when performance is “impracticable.” The standard interpretation of this
doctrine is that performance is excused only when it is extremely costly, not when it is
merely cost-unjustified to perform in the sense meant in this paper. Thus, one might be
led to believe that the impracticability doctrine applies only when performance is
rendered excessively costly on account of risks that could not have been prevented, and
when the promisee is the cheaper risk-bearer.11 On reflection, however, this argument
turns out to be unconvincing. The problem is that most contracting parties who end up in
litigation—businesses, chiefly—are probably risk neutral or close to it, because they are
big or because they can purchase insurance from a third party. It is doubtful that
promisors are systematically more risk-averse than promisees are.12
The impracticability doctrine has another possible meaning. Suppose that a carrier
promises to deliver goods to a destination by a certain time, but then is unable to keep the
promise because of an event outside its control—a war that shuts a canal, for example.13
In cases such as this, courts do not automatically find against the carrier (as strict liability
would imply), nor do they evaluate the relative risk-aversion of the parties. Instead, they
examine whether the promisor could have kept its promise by taking reasonable
precautions. For example, suppose the carrier could have stopped the ship at a distance
from the canal, waited a reasonable time for further developments, and then taken a less
11
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onerous alternate route if the canal turned out to be closed. A court is more likely to
release the carrier from liability if it takes this precaution (but ultimately continues on the
same route and is blocked) than if it does not. Here, again, the court is influenced by
notions of fault. It examines whether the cost of the relevant precaution would have been
low enough, and the benefit great enough.
The Restatement, §261, recognizes the role of fault in the impracticability
doctrine:
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.14

If taken literally, this rule would seem to recognize that a negligence regime already
exists—almost. Recall that under the negligence regime the promisor is liable if (1) he
fails to perform when performance is cost-justified, or (2) he fails to perform and
performance is not cost-justified only because the promisor failed to take cost-justified
precautions. If “impracticable” means “not cost-justified,” and if “fault” means “failure to
take cost-justified precaution,” then §261 has the same meaning as the negligence rule.
The phrase “basic assumption” would need to be interpreted as any event that
rendered performance not cost-justified. This interpretation might seem implausible, but,
on the other hand, no one has supplied a satisfactory explanation of “basic assumption.”
Some judges and scholars fall back on the notion of foreseeability, arguing that the
impracticability doctrine applies only when the supervening event is unforeseeable. But
this argument makes little sense. The relevant question for the parties is not whether a
particular event occurs or can be foreseen but whether the parties’ costs rise, and
everyone can foresee that costs may rise. It does no violence to the sweeping language of
§261 to interpret it as consistent with a negligence standard.
Reasonable or Substantial Performance. Courts distinguish between material and
technical breaches, and between substantial and full performance; these distinctions often
turn on the question of fault. In Louisiana, courts can decline to dissolve a lease at the
14
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request of the lessor “where it finds that the breach of the lease is not major or where the
breach was not the fault of the [lessee] or where the [lessee] was in good faith.”15 The
Restatement similarly provides that, in determining whether a material breach occurred, a
court should take account of “the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to
perform or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.”16
In one of the Louisiana cases, the lessor had the right to cancel the lease if the lessee
violates a municipal ordinance and fails to correct the violation within ten days. The court
found that because the violations were “technical,” did not threaten immediate harm, and
were difficult to correct because of the complexity of municipal law, the breach was not
the result of the lessee’s fault, and thus could not justify termination.17
This line of cases provides important evidence that fault matters in contract law.
However, the cases do not unambiguously conform to the model described in Part I. To
see why, observe that victims of breach retain the right to obtain damages even for
“technical” breaches; what they do not have is the right to terminate the contract on
account of such breaches. Thus, the victim of a technical breach has the right to damages;
the victim of a material breach has the option to terminate (and sue for damages) or to sue
for damages alone. Clearly, the victim of the material breach has a more valuable
remedy, inasmuch as his remedy encompasses the remedy of the victim of the technical
breach; and he can, in effect, obtain supracompensatory damages whenever the breacher
is willing to pay him some amount not to terminate. By contrast, in the model, the
negligent breacher pays compensatory (rather than supracompensatory) damages and the
non-negligent breacher pays zero (rather than compensatory) damages.
The usual explanation for the right to terminate for material breach is not to
punish the breacher, but to ensure that the victim of breach can protect himself in a world
in which breachers are often judgment-proof. In other words, the right to sue for damages
is often worth nothing, while the right to terminate is worth a great deal. If this is the
case, then we can redescribe the cases in a manner that brings them (roughly or almost) in
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line with the model. When the breacher is negligent (or willful), courts ensure that the
victim has a remedy; when he is not, courts do not ensure that the victim has a remedy.
Good Faith and Best Efforts. The good faith and best effort rules are notoriously
nebulous and hard to define, and they serve various different functions. Consider Wood
v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,18 where the court held that a one-sided exclusive agency
agreement would be construed to include a good faith provision. Wood could market
Lucy’s designs and no other; Lucy appeared to have no obligation at all. The court held
that Lucy had to act in good faith, and this meant that she could not market her designs
on her own or using another agent. Here, good faith does not have a purpose related to
fault: it is to ensure that the consideration doctrine does not bar enforcement of a
commercially reasonable albeit apparently one-sided contract.
In other cases, however, the good faith and best efforts rules play a role in
determining liability. In Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc.,19 the contract required the
defendant, a bread baking business, to sell to the plaintiff all of its breadcrumbs output
for a certain period. Later, the defendant decided to stop production of breadcrumbs in
order to create space for a computer room. Because the contract required defendant only
to sell its output, and its output ceased when it dismantled the equipment for making
breadcrumbs, the defendant argued that it had not breached the contract. The plaintiff
argued that the defendant had breached the contract by failing to act in good faith. The
court agreed.
The court acknowledged that the defendant could have reduced its output without
violating the contract, and could even have ceased production if its losses were “more
than trivial.” But it held against the defendant because the defendant asserted in a
“conclusory” fashion, that is, without evidence, that the breadcrumb operation had
become “uneconomical.”20 The court also mentioned that the six-month cancellation
clause allowed the defendant to protect itself to some extent, that the defendant offered to
resume breadcrumb production if plaintiff paid a slightly higher price than that stipulated
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in the contract, and that the defendant did not take steps to obtain “more economical
equipment.”21
The court appeared to believe that the defendant’s breach was willful. The
defendant had simply discovered that the price it obtained was less than its costs,
including its opportunity costs, tried to hold out for a higher price, and then shut down
operations when the plaintiff refused the offer. What is relevant to the argument here is
the reference in the opinion to the conditions under which defendant’s behavior might
have been excused. The language implies that defendant could have avoided liability by
showing that it could not have taken reasonable steps to reduce its costs to a tolerable
level.22 Because the defendant did not make such a showing, we do not know whether the
court would have excused liability on the basis of absence of fault (on the cost-benefit
interpretation or any other), but the language does suggest such an outcome.23
Interpretation/implied terms. One might respond by arguing that the court in Feld
was not so much relying on notions of fault as interpreting the contract. The case was a
strict liability case; it is just that the court (in effect) interpreted the contract to implicitly
provide that the baking company could cease output when cost-justified steps could not
ensure efficient performance and not otherwise. Having construed the contract in that
way, the defendant was strictly liable for failing to engage in cost-justified behavior.
But this is just an argument by definition. We could say that courts import fault
principles when they interpret contracts in order to preserve strict liability in making the
liability determination; or we could say that courts interpret contracts literally and use a
negligence rule in the liability determination. The two statements amount to the same
thing. The larger point is that courts, one way or the other, try—at least sometimes—to
eliminate or limit damages when the promisor could not have avoided breach through
cost-justified actions—that is, was not negligent.

21

Id. at 320.
However, the court expressed doubt about whether such a test would be feasible. Id. at 323 (“In any
event, ‘economic feasibility’, an expression subject to many interpretations, would not be a precise or
reliable test.”)
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Cf. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981).
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Consider the following illustration from the second Restatement of Contracts. A
mining company hires an engineer to help reopen a mine for “$10,000 to be payable as
soon as the mine is in successful operation.” The engineer performs but the mine cannot
be reopened. The Restatement says that the engineer should nonetheless be paid.24
The point seems to be that the mining company most likely hired the engineer to
provide a service, and not to provide insurance in case that the service does not result in
successful opening of the mine. The only possible interpretation of this argument is that
the engineer should supply cost-justified efforts and no more. Again, the negligence idea
reappears. It is idle to argue about whether the doctrinal reason for this result is that the
contract “really” provides for only cost-justified performance or that the contract requires
performance but the engineer will be excused from liability as long as the performance
that he actually provides is cost-justified. In both cases, contract law operates as a
negligence-based system rather than as a strict liability system.25
Conditions. Many contracts contain express conditions, and the promisor is
obligated to perform only if those conditions are met. Even when contracts do not contain
express conditions, courts frequently imply conditions. There are no hard and fast rules
governing when conditions are implied, but there are patterns. For example, courts
frequently make payment conditional on performance even when the contract does not
say so.
Courts also imply conditions in much the same way that they imply other sorts of
terms, based on a judgment about what the parties would have agreed to. This kind of
judgment will reflect principles of fault when courts believe that parties would have
wanted such principles in their contract. For example, in Jacobs & Young,26 a contractor
breached a contract by failing to install the type of pipes that the contract specified. The
promisee refused to pay, invoking the traditional rule that payment is conditional on
performance.
The court appeared to believe that the cost of performance (tearing down the
building and installing the correct pipes) exceeded the value of performance (installation
24

Restatement, 2d, of Contracts, s. 227, Ill. 2.
To be sure, if the contract explicitly provides for a negligence standard of liability—that is, it says that
the promisor must take cost-justified actions—then “strict” enforcement of such a contract would produce
the same outcome as fault-based enforcement.
26
129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
25
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of the correct pipes, which apparently were not functionally different from the pipes that
were installed); the question is whether it also believed that the failure to notice the
mistake before installation occurred was inadvertent rather than negligent. In pointing out
that an architect inspected but failed to notice the error, the court implied that the error
was inadvertent.27 In the face of explicit contractual language to the contrary, the court
eliminated liability (or greatly reduced it) because the breach was not negligent or willful.
For another example, consider Royal-Globe Ins. Co. v. Craven.28 An insurance
contract conditioned payout on notice of the claim within twenty-four hours of the
accident. Theresa Craven, the insured, was unconscious during that period and so could
not provide notice, but failed to give notice until three months after she was released from
the hospital. The court excused her from the promise to give notice within twenty-four
hours but held that she failed to comply with an implicit obligation to give notice within a
reasonable time after she had recovered, and thus was not entitled to payment.
Alternatively, one could describe the result in terms of a negligence system. Craven’s
breach of her promise to give notice within twenty-four hours was not willful or
negligent—she was unconscious. Further, there was nothing she could have done prior to
the date of performance to ensure that she could have given notice when her duty to do so
arose. By contrast, the failure to inform promptly after she returned to health was clearly
negligent (or even willful). It would have cost Craven very little, while notice gives the
insurance company a chance to verify the claim before the evidence becomes stale.
Damages. George Cohen argues that the damage measures reflect fault principles.
He points out that courts sometimes award restitution damages when breach is willful,
and sometimes award reduced damages—reliance damages, for example—when the
breach was inadvertent or negligent.29 Similarly, the draft third Restatement of
Restitution provides that the remedy for “opportunistic breach” may be disgorgement of
the breacher’s gains.30 When the breacher’s gains are significant, the victim’s remedy
may be supracompensatory.
27

Id. at 890. The brand was printed on the outside of the pipe in intervals but the pipe was otherwise
indistinguishable from other pipes.
28
585 N.E.2d 315 (1992).
29
Cohen, supra.
30
Restatement of Restitution §39 (tentative draft no. 4). For similar principles, see Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §357.
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In fact, in a fault-based system courts should award zero damages rather than
reliance damages when breach is inadvertent, and should award at least full damages (V
minus any unpaid portion of the price) when breach is negligent. Thus, a negligence
regime would operate by excusing conduct through liability rules rather than adjusting
damages. Nonetheless, Cohen may well be right that the range of damage remedies
reflects different attitudes toward willful, negligent, and inadvertent breach. In a strict
liability system of contract liability, a (potentially) supracompensatory remedy for breach
makes no sense. Putting aside special cases,31 a supracompensatory remedy just deters
efficient breach.32 In a negligence regime, by contrast, a supracompensatory remedy for
opportunistic breach does not deter efficient breach, as long as opportunistic breach
means that V > C, that is, as long as breach would be, in fact, inefficient. The promisor
should always perform when performance is efficient. As long as no remedy is awarded
in case of non-negligent or inadvertent breach, the promisor will breach efficiently and
only then. There is no reason to award greater damages when breach is willful than when
breach is negligent, but no harm comes from this practice, either.33

III. Burden-Shifting: A Puzzle
A “pure” fault-based system for contract law, analogous to the fault-based system
of tort law, would look like this: the plaintiff recovers for breach of contract only if he
can show that the defendant’s breach was wrongful rather than inadvertent—for example,
that the defendant failed to take a cost-justified precaution that would have ensured that
performance was value-maximizing, or engaged in inefficient breach.
The real system looks, arguably, more like this: the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case for breach of contract by showing that a breach occurred. However, the
defendant can rebut that case—or reduce damages—if he can show that his breach was

31

Such as the use of damage multipliers when breach is difficult to detect. See Richard Craswell,
Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2185, 2230
(1999).
32
See Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supercompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of
Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 Yale L.J. 369 (1990).
33
Again, a similar result can be found in the literature on tort law. See, e.g., Shavell supra.
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not wrongful—that performance was not value-maximizing and he could not have
ensured that it would have been by taking a cost-justified precaution.34
This difference raises a puzzle. Why does the tort victim have the burden of
proving that the defendant acted willfully or negligently, while the contract victim does
not have such a burden—must merely show causation?
To answer this question, one must draw on the literature on burdens of proof in
civil procedure, where one finds two approaches. First, some people argue that the burden
of proof is, or should be, put on the party with better access to the relevant information.
In our setting, the claim would have to be that the tort victim has better access to
information about the defendant’s precautions, while the contract breach victim has
worse access to information about the breacher’s precautions than the breacher does. This
seems plausible for the contract case but backwards for the tort case. Normally, the
tortfeasor has better information about his own precautions than the victim does, so one
would expect that once the victim shows causation, the tortfeasor should have the burden
to show that he took adequate precautions.35 So the approach seems like an unfruitful
way to explain the contract rule, even though it is consistent with it.
Second, others have argued that burdens of proof can be used to sharpen the
incentives of parties to engage in desirable activities. For example, Chris Sanchirico
shows that burdening the victim of a tort sharpens the incentives of potential tortfeasors
to take care because taking care allows them to avoid litigation costs when the victim has
the burden and not when the tortfeasor has the burden. This argument also does not help.
Just as we want to strengthen the incentives of potential tortfeasors to take care, we want
to strengthen the incentives of promisors to take care.
Most likely, a satisfactory explanation of the puzzle lies in the murky common
law history of the two doctrines. The case for negligence and the case for strict liability
are about equivalent—both in tort36 and, as I have argued, in contract. It would follow
that courts might have trouble coordinating around a single approach. Indeed, just as
there are pockets of negligence in contract law, there are pockets of strict liability in tort
34

In some cases, for example, in interpretation cases, however, the burden is effectively on the victim to
prove the relevant interpretation.
35
Chris William Sanchirico, A Primary Activity Approach to Proof Burdens, unpub. m.s. 2006.
36
See Shavell, supra. The two rules do not always lead to identical results, of course; but even when they
do not, each rule is superior under equally plausible (but different) conditions.
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law. The different patterns probably reflect arbitrary historical contingencies rather than a
normatively relevant difference in the types of behavior regulated by the two bodies of
law.37

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
eric_posner@uclaw.uchicago.edu

37

German contract law is a fault-based system but fault is presumed, and scholars believe that, in practice,
German courts tend toward strict liability. So American and German law have different starting points but
may well end up at a midpoint.
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